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Abstract This paper presents a game theoretic model of property tax
assessment that allows a tax appraiser to either choose a high or
a low assessment. The owner either accepts or challenges this
assessment. A ‘‘ﬁxed effects’’ regression model is used to
evaluate the differences in the assessed values of a sample of
houses from Bexar County, Texas during 2000 and 2001. Where
the owner of the house is identiﬁed as a state licensed property
tax consultant, the assessed value, after adjusting for size, age,
and other economic characteristics, ranged from a statistically
robust 2.5% to 6.2% lower than neighboring houses.
Do real estate experts beneﬁt from their superior information? George A. Akerlof,
A. Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz were awarded the 2001 Nobel Memorial
Prize for Economic Sciences for providing a basis for a multitude of studies that
assess economic outcomes when the information held by various participants in
an economy vary; that is, when there is asymmetric information. Akerlof (1970),
for example, uses information asymmetry to explain why people over 65 years of
age ﬁnd it difﬁcult to buy medical insurance, and why employers, based on a
proﬁt motive, may refuse to hire minorities. Information economics suggests that
there are numerous situations where distinct equilibriums will occur if groups can
be stratiﬁed by the information each possesses. Leland and Pyle (1977) note that
many ﬁnancial markets exhibit informational asymmetries. Borrowers have more
information about their own collateral, industriousness, and moral rectitude than
do lenders, and entrepreneurs have more information about their projects than do
potential ﬁnanciers.
Clapp, Dolde, and Tirtitoglu (1995) ﬁnd evidence of diffusion of housing price
changes that is temporal within individual towns and spatial between neighboring
towns. They posit this diffusion is probably a reaction to information ﬂows. Dolde
and Tirtiroglu (1997) present a model of real estate price dynamics to examine
information diffusion in real estate prices and extend the empirical work of
Tirtiroglu (1992) and Clapp and Tirtiroglu (1994). Milgrom and Stokey (1982)
argue that uninformed agents are reluctant to trade with informed agents. Garmaise
and Moskowitz (2004) ﬁnd strong evidence for asymmetric information in276  Firoozi, Hollas, Rutherford, and Thomson
commercial real estate markets. They provide evidence that information
asymmetries result in favoring the purchase of nearby properties and properties
with long income histories, and a reduction in trade with informed brokers. As a
result, there is a type of market segmentation between informed and uninformed
markets, in which informed brokers are more likely to sell to other informed
brokers. The authors argue that market segmentation illustrates the importance of
information asymmetries in the commercial real estate market. While many
examples of asymmetric information have been proffered, Garmaise and
Moskowitz suggest there have been few empirical tests of the theory of
asymmetric information.
Two recent papers assess informational asymmetry in residential real estate
markets by probing whether real estate agents sell their own houses for more than
they sell similar client owned houses. Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005),
using data from the Dallas–Forth Worth metropolitan area ﬁnd that agent owned
houses sell for approximately 4.5% more than other houses. Levitt and Syverson
(2005) report on a similar study using data from the Chicago area and ﬁnd similar
results. They estimate a 3.7% selling price premium for real estate agents selling
their own home. Both papers suggest that real estate agents use their superior
information to obtain the higher price.
In the valuation of property for tax purposes, property tax consultants possess
superior information regarding the house appraisal process, a feel for the local
market, and knowledge of the protest procedure. If a tax consultant deems the
county determined property assessment high, the consultant can, with a relatively
low cost, evaluate the evidence and ﬁle a protest. A more typical property owner
would ﬁrst have to realize that the appraisal was high and then would either have
to learn the appraisal and protest methods, or hire outside expertise such as a
licensed tax consultant. Either way the typical homeowner incurs greater costs
than does the consultant. Whether there would be a beneﬁt in the form of a lower
appraisal is uncertain. This asymmetry in information suggests a potential for
differing appraisals in the same market. It is reasonable to hypothesize, that on
average, licensed tax consultants will have lower assessed values than other
property owners, as it is unlikely that all other property owners hire a consultant
or successfully appeal on their own.
An appraisal is an estimate of fair market value, and is subject to some error. It
is often stated that an appraisal should provide a value that is accurate within 10%
of the true fair market value of a property. In other words, there is some reasonable
range in which various appraisers may disagree on value. A property tax
consultant trained in appraisal might exploit this fact by presenting evidence that
could result in a modest decrement of appraised value that would still be a valid
estimate of fair market value. The cost to the consultant would be low, due to the
individual’s expertise, while the cost to an ordinary property owner could be
signiﬁcant, and perceived payoff may be low.
In sum, it seems reasonable to suggest the existence of information based ﬁnal
appraisals that carry a bias in form of a modest gain to property tax consultants.Property Assessments and Information Asymmetry  277
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If high gains were likely, other owners would realize their property appraisal
seemed high, and would either learn to protest themselves, or would employ a
consultant. The primary hypothesis of this paper proposes that, ceteris paribus,a
property tax consultant will exploit information asymmetry to gain a somewhat
lower appraised value than for neighboring houses. If properties are commonly
over-assessed, property assessments that are lower for property owners who protest
their appraisals in an attempt to lower their assessments should be able to be
detected. An important question to investigate is whether protests in general lead
to lower assessments.
To test the stated hypotheses, the assessed values of houses in Bexar County,
Texas, for state licensed property tax consultants and other homeowners are
investigated. First, a game theoretic model of property tax assessment is presented
that allows the appraised value to depend on the likelihood that a homeowner will
challenge the assessment. A brief summary is then presented of the property
taxation and the appeal process for Bexar County. Next there is a discussion of
the empirical data, and an econometric model is speciﬁed to detect whether
information asymmetry exists (i.e., whether tax consultants have lower assessed
values). There is then a discussion of the empirical ﬁndings. The paper closes
with concluding comments.
 A Game-Theoretic Model of Property Assessment
This section presents a model that illustrates game-theoretic interactions between
assessors (A) and homeowners (H). The discussion demonstrates that in a rational
context, a property assessor’s choice of assessed value will depend on the
assessor’s estimation of the likelihood that homeowners will challenge the
assessment value, and on the expected payoffs and penalties associated with
assessments challenges. The presentation here incorporates elements of interactive
structure and rationality that provides a testable prediction regarding assessment
outcomes. The strategic results generate interesting optimality implications for
assessors and homeowners that serve as a foundation for the empirical
investigation that follows.
Consider an assessor who is expected to generate revenue while maintaining
assessment credibility within the homeowner community. For simplicity, assume
a neighborhood with similar housing attributes for which the assessor must choose
between one of the following assessed values for each home:
AL  Assess at a low value that has low probability of being challenged by
homeowners.
AH  Assess at a high value that has greater probability of being challenged by
homeowners.
Homeowners in the neighborhood must choose how to respond to the appraisal
that is presented to them. Homeowners choose one of the strategies deﬁned below:278  Firoozi, Hollas, Rutherford, and Thomson











HC  Homeowner challenges the assessment. A high knowledge homeowner has
a low-cost to recognize and challenge the high assessment (AH) due to the
individual’s superior information regarding home values and the assessment
and challenge process. Knowledgeable homeowners can be expected to
challenge a high assessment.
HN  Homeowner does not challenge the assessment. A homeowner with little
knowledge or information about property assessment and the challenge
procedure incurs a high cost to recognize and to challenge a high
assessment (AH). Such homeowners are not expected to challenge any
assessment. High knowledge homeowners realize there is no gain to
challenge a low assessment and thus will choose this strategy for low
assessments (AL).
For the parameters deﬁned thus far, the set of pure strategies for the assessor is
{AH, AL}, and the set of pure strategies for the homeowner is {HC, HN}.
Exhibit 1 presents a two-stage dynamic game where the assessor plays ﬁrst.1 The
homeowner plays after observing the assessor’s choice. The payoffs in Exhibit 1
are:
ai  Payoff to the assessor from outcome i  1, 2, 3.
hi  Payoff to the homeowner from outcome i  1, 2, 3.
The three payoff outcomes are:
(a1, h1)  Payoff when the assessor plays the low assessment. Because the low
assessment is played, there is no incentive for any homeowner to
challenge so the homeowner chooses not to challenge.
(a2, h2)  Payoff when the assessor plays the high assessment and the homeowner
responds by challenging this high assessment.Property Assessments and Information Asymmetry  279
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(a3, h3)  Payoff when the assessor plays the high assessment and the homeowner
does not challenge this high assessment.
Two cases are evaluated: the case of complete information and the more relevant
case of incomplete information. In the case of complete information, there can be
only one type of homeowner—those with high knowledge (i.e., low cost to
challenge) and all parameters of the game are common knowledge. Every
homeowner who faces the AH assessment will challenge and will be successful.
For the assessor, a successful challenge of AH will have two cost components: (1)
reduction of the assessment to AL, and (2) some administrative costs and credibility
loss. The second component of this cost is the penalty that causes the assessor
to avoid excessively high assessments. Accordingly, the following rationality
conditions are imposed on the assessor’s payoffs. First, an unchallenged high
assessment generates a superior payoff for the assessor reﬂected by a1  a3 and
a2  a3. Second, there is a penalty for generating an assessment that is successfully
challenged, which is reﬂected by a2  a1.
A homeowner who faces the high assessment AH and does not challenge will be
worse off than the case of facing the low assessment AL. Further, for simplicity
and without compromising the main results, in the numerical example that follows
it is assumed that a homeowner who faces the high assessment AH and challenges
will end up better off than the case where the assessor had applied the low
assessment AL. The stated features are reﬂected in the following symmetric
example of payoffs:
(a , h )  (0, 0), (a , h )  (1, 1), (a , h )  (1, 1) 11 22 33
Under complete information, backward induction for this example leads to the
low assessment (AL) as the Nash equilibrium. This outcome emerges because every
homeowner would choose the payoff proﬁle (1, 1) over (1, 1), so the assessor
chooses the payoff proﬁle (0, 0) to prevent the worse outcome, from the assessor
point of view, of (1, 1).
In the incomplete information case, there are homeowners who have inferior
knowledge of assessment and challenge process and thus face a high cost to
challenge. In this situation, the assessor knows that only a fraction of the
homeowners will challenge the high assessment AH. There is a positive probability
that a homeowner facing the high assessment AH will challenge. Let  be the
belief of the assessor of the probability that a homeowner facing AH will challenge.
Because only high type owners will challenge,  can also be seen as the assessor
estimate of the probability that the homeowner is the high type. Many formal
issues associated with the Bayesian Nash equilibrium are abstracted for such
games and the focus here will be on the backward induction under the belief of
the assessor. Under the payoffs and the belief stated above, the assessor’s expected
payoff from choosing the high assessment AH is:280  Firoozi, Hollas, Rutherford, and Thomson
(a )  (1  )(a ). (1) 23
It is clear that the assessor will optimally choose the high assessment AH over the
low assessment AL if, in the assessor’s belief,  is low enough so that the expected
payoff from choosing the high assessment is higher than simply playing low
assessment. Stated more formally, the following condition must be satisﬁed for
the assessor to choose the high assessment:
(a )  (1  )(a )  a (2) 23 1 .
This result can be alternatively stated in terms of the  values for which a high
assessment is the rational choice for the assessor, that is:
  (a  a )/(a  a ). (3) 13 23
The rationality conditions stated earlier, a1  a3 and a2  a3 demonstrate that (a1
 a3)  0 and (a2  a3)  0. These conditions guarantee that  is positive. The
rationality condition of a2  a1 ensures that   1. Stated alternately, if   1,
Equation (1) states a2  a1, contradicting the rationality condition a2  a1 showing
that a high assessment AH cannot be optimal.
For the values given in the symmetric numerical example stated above, (a1  0,
a2  1, and a3  1), the high assessment, AH, will be chosen only if the
assessor’s belief satisﬁes   1⁄2. In other words, for the numerical example, the
assessor will assign the high assessed value AH only if the assessor believes that
less than 50% of the homeowners will challenge this assessment.
The above general and numerical results demonstrate that the choice of property
assessment value by a rational assessor depends on the assessor’s estimation of
the likelihood that homeowners will challenge and on the structure of the payoffs.
A rational assessor will incorporate a best estimate of the likelihood of challenge
when setting the initial assessment value. In a posterior sense, however, differences
in homeowner knowledge (and thus cost to successfully challenge a high
assessment) will lead to adjustments in the ﬁnal assessment houses because when
the assessor assigns the high assessment to a knowledgeable homeowner, that
owner will successfully challenge the assessment.
Two primary predictions can be established from the imperfect information model.
First, when the number of high knowledge homeowners is a low fraction of the
population being assessed, and appraisers have no information to evaluate the type
of an individual homeowner, the value maximizing choice for the appraiser is toProperty Assessments and Information Asymmetry  281
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choose the high assessment for everyone. The low knowledge homeowner will
accept this assessment. In response to the high assessment, the high knowledge
homeowner will challenge the assessment to achieve the lower appraisal. The
overall payoff to the assessor will be higher following this strategy rather than
giving everyone the low assessment. An effect of the appraiser choosing this
strategy will be to observe that high knowledge homeowners successfully
challenge their initial assessment.
Second, if the assessor has some information that can help reﬁne the estimate of
type, , the assessor will choose to give the homeowners that are suspected as
having high knowledge (i.e., low cost) the low assessment so as not to trigger a
successful challenge. Alternately, if there were cronyism or fraud between the tax
assessors and property tax consultants, the low assessment would be observed to
beneﬁt the preferred party. The remaining homeowners whom the assessor believes
are low knowledge, or have no connections, will receive the high assessment.
The observed ﬁnal assessment outcome from either alternative will be the same.
High knowledge homeowners are expected to have a lower assessment either
because such owners are uncommon so their successful challenges are not overly
costly, or that the appraiser has identiﬁed these homeowners and has initially
assessed them at the low value to prevent a challenge. The empirical model
presented in the next section separates owners who are licensed property tax
consultants, who are deemed to be high knowledge homeowners, from other
homeowners who are deemed to be low knowledge homeowners. The empirical
study tests the hypothesis of whether these different homeowner groups receive
equal property assessments.
 Property Taxation in Bexar County, Texas
San Antonio is the largest city in Bexar County and most of the sample properties
are located in San Antonio. The Bexar County Appraisal District assesses property
at ‘‘100% of the Market Value except as otherwise provided by law.’’2 Residential
property assessments are made via a mass appraisal method based primarily on
the sales comparison approach, with updated appraisals being made at least every
three years. For any random sample of appraisals, one can expect that at least
one-third have been updated that year while others may be based on
determinations made in the past one or two years with simple adjustments to
measure current value. If the homeowner believes the appraised value is too high,
the individual can ﬁle an appeal and take the case to an Appraisal Review Board,
where the homeowner (or the agent representing the owner) will present evidence
of value, and the Chief Appraiser represents the Appraisal District. Prior to this
formal hearing panel, the homeowner may choose to undergo an informal review
with a District Appraiser. At the review stage, the property owner presents the
case of why the assessment appears to be too high. Based on the evidence
presented, the review appraiser can adjust the appraised value. If the two parties
work out a mutually agreeable appraisal, this new value will be assigned to the282  Firoozi, Hollas, Rutherford, and Thomson
property and the case will not proceed to the Appraisal Review Board. If the
property owner is not satisﬁed, or does not choose to undergo informal review,
the case will proceed to a hearing panel before the Appraisal Review Board. The
Board, based on the evidence presented on both sides, can accept the value
presented by either side or some other value. The Board may increase or decrease
the assessment originally provided resulting in a ‘‘Board Determined’’ value or it
might dismiss the case resulting in a ‘‘Board Dismissed’’result, which is the value
originally proposed. Appraised values that are not protested to the Appraisal
Review Board are called ‘‘Certiﬁed Values.’’
 Data and Methodology
A list of Licensed Property Tax Consultants in Bexar County was obtained from
the State of Texas Appraiser and Licensing Board.3 Of the initial sample of 73
consultants in Bexar County, 46 were identiﬁed that owned a house and had
neighboring houses. The total panel sample over two years, matched by location,
consists of 503 property observations. Forty-six houses were owned by tax
consultants in 2000, with forty-ﬁve of those houses owned by the same consultant
in 2001, resulting in 91 tax consultants observations and 412 observations of
houses owned by neighbors of property tax consultants. The property appraisal
data for each of the 503 house observations was collected by searching the Bexar
County Appraisal District website. In addition to the appraisal data, the website
provides a map that allows one to identify the neighboring houses. The empirical
analysis is limited by the variables that are carried in the public record. Available
variables are the appraised (assessed) value, the size of the house, the size of the
lot, the age of the house, the number of rooms in the house, the number of stories
in the house, and an indicator of the quality of the house. With the exception of
the indicators for licensed property tax consultants, the remaining covariates
mainly serve as control variables. Exhibit 2 describes the variables that were
created from this data.
Exhibit 3 presents the descriptive statistics for these variables and presents tests
that indicate that for most variables, there is no statistical difference in the means
of the characteristics between the properties owned by consultants and those of
their neighbors. In the sample, the average appraised value is $160,802 with an
average size of 2,271 square feet, and an average age of about 21 years. The one
variable that shows a statistical difference is the likelihood of the assessment being
Board Determined. For non-consultants, about 12% of the values are Board
Determined, whereas for consultants, about 31% of the values are Board
Determined, indicating that consultants take their case to the Review Board more
than 2.5 times as often as non-consultants.
One of the objectives is to test whether there is an information separation between
property tax consultants and other homeowners that can be reliably measured by
a difference in assessed value. The second objective is to determine whether BoardProperty Assessments and Information Asymmetry  283
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Exhibit 2  Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Description
Appraised Value The assessed value for each house.
Price per Square Foot The assessed value divided by total square feet.
Property Tax Consultant A dummy variable indicating that the property is owned by a
state licensed property tax consultant.
Size The size of the house in hundred square feet.
Size Squared Size squared.
Age The age of house in decades (year of assessment minus year
built divided by ten).
Age Squared Age squared.
Total Rooms The total number of rooms in the house.
Fair Quality A dummy variable indicating a house of fair to average
condition/desirability/quality as deﬁned by the appraisal
district.
Good Quality A dummy variable indicating a house of good condition/
desirability/quality as deﬁned by the appraisal district, this
variable is held out in the regression models.
Excellent Quality A dummy variable indicating a house of excellent condition/
desirability/quality as deﬁned by the appraisal district.
Lot Size The size of the lot measured in thousand square feet.
Number of Stories The number of stories in house as reported by the appraisal
district.
Year 2001 A dummy variable indicating the data was from year 2001 (year
2000 indicator is held out in the model).
Certiﬁed Value A dummy variable indicating the assessed value is the value
certiﬁed by the appraisal district (this variable is held out in the
regression models).
Board Determined A dummy variable indicating an appeal was made to the
appraisal board and the assessed value was determined by the
appraisal board.
Board Dismissed A dummy variable indicating an appeal to the appraisal board
that ended in dismissal with the assessed value remaining the
certiﬁed value.
Location Group Identiﬁer A set of dummy variables indicating the group identiﬁer (1-44)
for the house. (Because location group identiﬁers are not in





















































Appraised Value 160,802 116,000 162,824 118,300 151,651 109,000 0.74 0.83
Price per Square Foot 2001 66.528 59.091 66.127 59.77 62.815 55.43 1.25 2.03*
Property Tax Consultant 0.181 0.00 — — 1.000 1.00 —
Size 22.712 20.48 22.712 20.72 22.714 19.32 0.00 0.31
Size Squared 590.978 419.43 592.226 429.32 585.331 373.26 0.12 0.31
Age 2.087 1.60 2.089 1.60 2.078 1.60 0.05 0.02
Age Squared 7.490 2.56 7.489 2.56 7.497 2.56 0.01 0.02
Total Rooms 7.026 7.00 7.039 7.00 6.967 7.00 0.37 0.28
Fair Quality 0.408 0.00 0.403 0.00 0.429 0.00 0.45 0.45
Good Quality 0.402 0.00 0.408 0.00 0.374 0.00 0.60 0.60
Excellent Quality 0.191 0.00 0.189 0.00 0.198 0.00 0.19 0.19
Lot Size 11.125 9.71 11.031 9.60 11.552 9.96 0.84 0.57
Number of Stories 1.333 1.00 1.331 1.00 1.341 1.00 0.19 0.16
Year 2001 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.09 0.09
Certiﬁed Value 0.835 1.00 0.871 1.00 0.670 1.00 4.77* 4.67*
Board Determined 0.151 0.00 0.117 0.00 0.308 0.00 4.70* 4.60*
Board Dismissed 0.014 0.00 0.012 0.00 0.022 0.00 0.72 0.72
Location Group Identiﬁer 21.99 21.00 21.86 22.00 22.02 21.00 0.17 0.11
Notes: This table contains descriptive statistics for the full sample and subsamples of property tax consultant owned and nearest neighbors (non-property tax
consultant owned) for data from Bexar County, Texas appraisal ﬁles for years 2000 and 2001. Univariate test statistics for the difference in characteristics
between licensed property tax consultant owned and non-property tax consultant owned houses are presented. The t-Statistics are calculated to test the null:
mean (licensed property tax consultant owned) –mean (non-property tax consultant owned)  0, under the assumption that the two subsamples are random
and independently selected and the sampled population is approximately normal. The nonparametric Wilcoxon statistic is to test whether the licensed
property consultant owned and non-property tax consultant owned houses have identical distributions, with the assumption that the two samples are random
and independent. For the full sample, n  503; for property owned by neighbor, n  412; for property owned by licensed tax consultant, n  91.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.Property Assessments and Information Asymmetry  285
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Determined values differ from Certiﬁed Values. Speciﬁcally, it is posited that
property tax consultants exploit their superior knowledge to obtain lower assessed
values and that homeowners may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to appeal to the Review Board.
Stated more formally, the following questions are tested, ceteris paribus:
H10: Homeowners who are property tax consultants have the same assessed
house values as other homeowners,
versus
H1A: Homeowners who are property tax consultants have lower assessed
house values than other homeowners.
And,
H20: Board Determined values are the same as Certiﬁed Values,
versus
H2A: Board Determined values differ from Certiﬁed Values.
To test the hypothesis, a ‘‘ﬁxed effects’’ regression model4 is employed (see
Maddala, 1977 or Greene, 2003, p. 285), employing the common appraisal
approach of the log-linear speciﬁcation:
ln(V )    X   , (4) ij j ij ij
where ln(Vij) is the natural log of the appraised value for home i at location j.
The ij term is a classical disturbance with E[ij]  0 and Var[ij]  Xij is a 2  . 
matrix of attributes (as noted in Exhibit 2) describing home i at location j.  is
a vector of regression coefﬁcients and j are the location intercepts. This model
assumes a set of constant  coefﬁcients across locations with each location having
its own intercept and error terms. The variation across groups (i.e., property tax
consultant locations) is captured by the intercept for each location.
 Results
By choosing the widely accepted approach in hedonic appraisals of using the
natural log of the appraised value as the independent variable, the coefﬁcient for
an indicator variable is approximately the average percentage difference in
assessed value when the indicator takes the value 1. Model 1 evaluates the
appraisal results without reference to whether the value was a Certiﬁed Value or
a Board Determined. Model 2 includes indicator variables for Board Value and
Board Dismissed to determine whether appealing to the Board affects the
assessment. Model 3 replaces the single indicator variable for tax consultant with
a set of three indicator variables that are the interaction of tax consultant with
Certiﬁed Value, Board Determined, and Board Dismissed. This allows
investigation of whether differences for consultants’ appraisals vary by whether a
protest was ﬁled.286  Firoozi, Hollas, Rutherford, and Thomson
The regression results are presented in Exhibit 4. For all three models, the negative
signs coupled with statistical signiﬁcance demonstrate that property tax
consultants receive lower appraisals; thus, the ﬁrst null hypothesis is rejected,
which implies ceteris paribus that property tax consultants have a lower assessed
value. In particular, Model 1 indicates that property tax consultants have an
assessed value that is a statistically reliable 3.4% lower than their neighbors. Most
of the control variables are signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level or better, showing that
these variables are important in determining the assessed value of the houses
evaluated. The coefﬁcient for Year 2001 shows that assessments are about 4.6%
higher than the previous year. Total Rooms and the Excellent Quality indicators
show no statistically important effects.
The second hypothesis concerns whether lower tax valuations can be obtained
through protesting to the Review Board. Exhibit 3 shows that property tax
consultants undertake more than 2.5 times as many appeals to the Review Board
than do other homeowners, which suggests that they expect their appeals to be
successful. Model 2, presented in Exhibit 4, includes the indicators of Board
Determined and Board Dismissed assessments in the analysis to evaluate whether
a difference can be detected. Both of these indicator variables designate that an
appeal to the Board has been made. Board Dismissed means the Board accepted
the original appraisal while Board Determined could be a higher or lower value
than the appraisal district determination. Model 2 ﬁnds no signiﬁcant distinction
for Board Determined and Board Dismissed assessments compared to the left out
category of Certiﬁed Value, which indicates that protesting to the Review Board
appears neutral in terms of its effect on the assessed value. Note that this result
does not lend insight as to whether it is valuable to appeal to the Review Board.
In general, appeals are only made when the initial appraisal is deemed too high,
so this result can be interpreted as showing that the appeals process leads to the
fair appraisal value homeowners were seeking, rather than a chance to get an
unduly low appraisal. It cannot be determined whether an appraisal was reduced
through appeal. The ﬁnal value is statistically no different whether achieved
through the Certiﬁed Value or the Board Determined alternative.
To further understand the relationship between the values realized by tax
consultants, and the fact that they are more likely to appeal, Model 3 interacts the
tax consultant variable with Certiﬁed Value, Board Value, and Board Dismissed
indicators. These variables separate the consultants into those that protested to the
Board and those that did not, and it evaluates the effect of their appeal. Consultants
who did not appeal to the Board realize a value that is about 2.5% lower than
would otherwise be expected. There are two potential explanations for this result,
and both may be operative. On one hand, this lower value may be due to effect
of past protests that presented reasons why their property should be evaluated at
a lower value. In other words, this ﬁnding may indicate that a positive protest
result may persist over time so that the value of successful protest remains for
more than a single year. On the other hand, this may simply indicate that the
consultant proceeded to the informal review stage where a somewhat lowerProperty Assessments and Information Asymmetry  287
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Exhibit 4  Fixed Effects Regression Models
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 11.283 11.286 11.282
189.93* 188.79* 188.63*
Property Tax Consultant 0.034 0.034 N/A
3.47* 3.35* N/A
Size 0.036 0.036 0.036
10.34* 10.31* 10.36*
Size2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
2.50* 2.47* 2.57*
Age 0.154 0.154 0.153
5.30* 5.30* 5.27
Age2 0.020 0.020 0.020
5.98* 5.95* 5.94
Total Rooms 0.004 0.004 0.004
0.93 0.97 1.00
Fair Quality 0.134 0.134 0.134
6.22* 6.21* 6.20*
Excellent Quality 0.007 0.007 0.009
0.25 0.24 0.32
Lot Size 0.006 0.006 0.006
3.17* 3.19* 3.16*
Number of Stories 0.040 0.041 0.040
3.02* 3.03* 2.99
Year 2001 0.046 0.046 0.046
6.13* 5.96* 5.95*
Board Determined 0.003 0.009
0.23 0.64
Board Dismissed 0.039 0.032
1.17 0.84












F-Statistic 103.480 87.570 76.140
Adj. R2 0.796 0.795 0.796
Akaike’s Information Criterion 2.041 2.036 2.034288  Firoozi, Hollas, Rutherford, and Thomson
Exhibit 4  (continued)
Fixed Effects Regression Models
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ramesy RESET Test: Ho: Model has no omitted variables
Calculated F-test 1.380 1.380 1.190
Prob  F 0.247 0.249 0.314
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier effect: Ho: Var()
 0
Calculated Chi-Square (1) 484.32 460.18 447.97
Prob  Chi-Square 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Hausman Speciﬁcation test for random versus ﬁxed
effects
Ho: No systematic differences in the coefﬁcients
Calculated Chi-Square (1) 2882.040 2249.120 2321.360
Prob  Chi-Square 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Notes: This table contains ﬁxed effects regression models of appraised values based on a sample
from 2000 and 2001 of 503 property assessments. The dependent variable is the log of the
assessed value. All regressions are estimated using ﬁxed effects to account for the location of the
properties. Coefﬁcients estimates are presented, with t-Statistics reported beneath and calculated
using heteroscedasticity-robust Huebner/White standard errors.
*Statistics (two-tailed test) with signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
appraisal was negotiated and the consultant did not feel it was worthwhile to
pursue the appeal process further. The consultant no doubt uses superior
knowledge to estimate the likelihood of gaining further relief by taking the appeal
to the next stage. The available data does not allow distinction as to whether it is
the persistence of a previous protest, or informal review, or a combination of both
that yields the noted 2.5% reduction. When a consultant chooses to take a case
to the Board and receives a Board Determined value, the results indicate the
consultant receives a 6.2% lower appraised value (which is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level). By converting the means in Exhibit 3 to raw values, one can
determine there were only two observations of Board Dismissed appraisals for
consultants. This lack of data results in no statistical inference being possible for
this situation, which is conﬁrmed by the insigniﬁcant t-Statistic for the covariate
of Board Dismissed interacted with Property Tax Consultant.
The average appraised value (see Exhibit 3) is about $161,000. Given that property
tax consultants, in general, have an assessed value about 3.4% lower than the
typical homeowner, and given the average tax rate in Bexar County is
approximately 3%,5 the average yearly property tax savings to a licensed property
tax consultant is about $160. The annual property tax savings for consultants onProperty Assessments and Information Asymmetry  289
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the median house in this sample would be about $115. Tax consultants that did
not complete an appeal to the Review Board save less than these amounts while
those that achieve a Board Determined value save more on their annual tax bill.
These ﬁndings indicate that information asymmetry exists in this residential
property assessment market. As noted in the game-theory section, assessors could
simply identify tax consultants and choose to award them the low appraisal, so
an alternate explanation for this result could be cronyism or fraud. In this case,
the information asymmetry would be of the form ‘‘who you know’’ rather than
‘‘what you know.’’ This information asymmetry may not provide a large enough
discrepancy to result in low knowledge homeowners employing consultants, thus
retaining different appraisal outcomes. If a reduction in assessment persisted over
time, the tax savings would be an annuity, which would be much more valuable
than a reduction for the year protested followed by an increase the next assessment
period.6
 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence of asymmetric information in the market
for residential property assessments. The results here provide statistically reliable
evidence that property tax consultants, after controlling for the size and type of
house as well as other factors, are assessed at somewhat lower values. The average
reduction in assessment is estimated to be about 3.4%. This leads to an annual
savings in taxes of about $115 for a median house, and $160 for an average house
in the sample drawn. The reductions appear to be well within acceptable bounds
for appraisal. The modest annual tax saving, generally less than $160, appears to
be small enough to allow this discrepancy to persist. In other words, the average
gain appears to be sufﬁciently small so that it may not worth many homeowners’
time to learn about appraisal and the protest procedure for the small gain offered.
Alternatively, the homeowner could hire a property tax consultant, but after paying
the consultant, the potential for gain would be low on average. The fact that
property tax consultants exist demonstrates there is a demand for their services,
which may be due the larger gains available when houses are excessively over-
appraised, rather than from the gain one might expect from protesting the
assessment on an average house.
 Endnotes
1 There is a large body of literature incorporating many formal game theoretic extensions
of the setup and discussion presented here, which includes issues associated with
signaling, credibility, and bargaining (e.g., Fundenberg and Tirole, 1991; or Gibbons,
1992).
2 From the Bexar County Appraisal District Assessment and Property Tax Notice. The
Bexar County Appraisal District website (www.bcad.org) provides information on the
appraisal and protest process.290  Firoozi, Hollas, Rutherford, and Thomson
3 This information is posted at its website: http://www.talcb.state.tx.us.
4 An alternative method for the analysis would be to employ a ‘‘random effects’’ model
(see Maddala, 1977, p. 326, or Greene, 2003, p. 285). Initially, both models were
evaluated. The Hausman test, reported for each model in Exhibit 4, indicates that the
ﬁxed effects model is preferred relative to the random effects model; so, for parsimony,
the ﬁndings are only reported using the ﬁxed effects model. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
Multiplier test, also reported for each model in Exhibit 4, indicates that either of the
ﬁxed or random effects model is preferred to the classical OLS model.
5 Tax rates vary by school district and also by municipality if not part of San Antonio.
6 One tax consultant ﬁrm has advertised a ﬁxed fee of $300 for representing a residential
property appeal (see www.propertytaxprotest.com). Anecdotal evidence from one of the
authors found that a protest that resulted in a reduction one year was followed by an
increased assessment the next year when none of the neighbors received increases. A
further protest that year resulted in a reduction that was followed by another increase the
next year, which was then successfully protested again.
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